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Abductive Moral Arguments and Godless
Normative Realism: An Evaluation of
Explanations for Moral Facts and
Motivations for Moral Behavior
Jonathan Smith

Introduction
For the vast majority of people, religion and morality are – prima facie –
closely related to one another. Hence, since moral arguments for the existence of
God relate morality to religion, it is unsurprising that moral arguments are
particularly appealing to the layman. Nevertheless, over the past few decades, there
has been a multitude of attempts to ground morality in something other than religion
with the hope that naturalism and certain moral intuitions might be compatible. One
popular attempt is given by Erik Wielenberg, a philosopher at DePauw University.
Wielenberg terms his foundation for morality Godless normative realism, wherein
he posits that there exist necessary, basic, and brute ethical facts that ground the
primary moral characteristics of the world. Since many moral arguments for the
existence of God are abductive arguments moving from certain moral
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characteristics of the world to the truth of theism, any non-theistic explanation of
these moral characteristics weakens abductive moral arguments. Within this paper,
I demonstrate that though Godless normative realism offers a possible explanation
for the existence of objective moral facts and motivations for moral behavior,
theism is a superior explanation. Consequently, though abductive moral arguments
for theism are weakened by the possibility that Godless normative realism is the
foundation of morality, one still has good reason to hold that theism is true given
the existence of objective moral facts and motivations for moral behavior.

Exposition
The Moral Argument
Generally, moral arguments for the existence of God are arguments moving
from certain moral characteristics of the world to the existence of God. There is a
multitude of moral arguments, and many of the arguments are interrelated to one
another. Within this paper, I am primarily concerned with whether Godless
normative realism offers a solid foundation for the existence of both (1) objective
moral facts and (2) sufficient motivations for individuals to be moral. Hence, the
moral argument presented within this paper is an abductive argument proposing
that theism is the best explanation for these two moral features of the world.1 The
argument can be given more formally as follows:

1

David Baggett and Jerry Walls, God and Cosmos: Moral Truth and Human Meaning
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
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(1) The best explanation for the existence of both objective moral facts and
sufficient motivations for individuals to be moral is that theism is true.
(2) There exist both objective moral facts and sufficient motivations for
individuals to be moral.
(3) Therefore, there is good reason to hold theism to be true.
As stated before, this argument is abductive, and hence, both of the premises could
be true and yet theism could be false. However, if both of the premises are true,
then the moral characteristics of the world offer good reason – at minimum – to
hold that theism is true.
Both theists and Godless normative realists affirm the second premise of the
above argument. However, theism and Godless normative realism are competing
explanations of the truth of the second premise. As a result, to evaluate the truth of
the conclusion of the argument, one must evaluate the strength of either
explanation. Moreover, if one can show that a non-theistic hypothesis is far stronger
than the theistic hypothesis, this serves to greatly weaken the conclusion of the
argument. There are two primary methodologies that may be taken to refute the
first premise of the moral argument given above. First, one may attempt to
demonstrate that theism does not offer a sufficient ground for the existence of both
objective moral facts and motivations for moral behavior. Second, one may offer
an alternative, and highly plausible, explanation for the existence of objective moral
facts and motivations for moral behavior. Wielenberg, in offering support for
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Godless normative realism, applies both methodologies. Hence, in evaluating
whether Godless normative realism offers a better explanation for the truth of
premise (2), we will examine both the theistic and non-theistic accounts.
God as an Insufficient Foundation for Objective Moral Facts
In the Platonic dialogue, Euthyphro, Socrates asks his interlocutor,
Euthyphro, an iconic question: “Is what is holy, holy because the Gods approve it,
or do they approve it because it is holy?”2 The dilemma can be stated in terms more
relevant to this paper as follows: “Is X good because God commands it, or does
God command X because it is good?” where X is some objective moral fact. If the
theist affirms the first disjunct, then morality seems – prima facie – to become
arbitrary. However, if the theist affirms the second disjunct, then moral value exists
independent of God; rather than decreeing what is good, God recognizes what is
good. In this way, if one affirms the latter disjunct, then theism fails to offer an
explanation for why certain moral facts obtain; the theist is in the same predicament
as the naturalist.
Wielenberg’s primary argument against the sufficiency of theism as an
explanation for objective moral facts rests on the success of the above dilemma.
Ultimately, Wielenberg evaluates not only the affirmation of the two disjuncts, but
also a popular method of escape through the horns of the dilemma. To understand

Plato, “Euthyphro,” in Classics of Philosophy, ed. Louis P. Pojman and Lewis Vaughn
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 31.
2
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the third option, it is helpful to begin with two propositions related to Divine
command theory (DCT): the control thesis and the dependency thesis. The control
thesis states that “Every logically consistent ethical claim, E, is such that God could
make E true.”3 The dependency thesis, on the other hand, states that “Every true
ethical claim is true in virtue of some act of will on the part of God.”4 Now, with
respect to these two theses, two variations of DCT may be defined: strong DCT and
weak DCT, where strong DCT affirms the truth of both theses while weak DCT
affirms the truth of only the dependency thesis.5 In particular, Divine nature theory,
the view that the nature of God is the foundation for necessary and objective moral
facts, is one variation of weak DCT.
Ultimately, Wielenberg rejects both strong and weak DCT. Strong DCT
appears to have trouble responding to the problem of evil since strong DCT entails
that God could have determined every evil that obtains in the actual world to be
good. However, since an omnibenevolent God would desire for the created world
to be fully good, such a consequence of strong DCT appears to negate the
possibility of an omnibenevolent God.6 Moreover, the thought of a possible world
in which some horrendous evil is morally praiseworthy is practically inconceivable,

3

Erik Wielenberg, Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), 40.
4

Ibid.

5

Ibid.

6

Ibid., 44.
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at least to the majority of ethicists. Since the control thesis entails that, in some
possible world, a multitude of horrendous evils are morally praiseworthy, the
control thesis contradicts firmly held moral intuitions.
Unlike strong DCT, the problem of evil does not pose a threat for weak
DCT, since weak DCT denies the control thesis. Moreover, weak DCT does not
entail that there exist possible worlds in which horrendous evils are morally
praiseworthy, and so, weak DCT coincides with our moral intuitions, at least in this
regard. However, Wielenberg rejects weak DCT via appeals to a different moral
intuition and the existence of intrinsically evil actions. Wielenberg states that the
dependency thesis entails the truth of counterfactuals such as the following: “if, per
impossible, God were not loving, He could make it the case that it is obligatory for
someone to inflict a gratuitous pummeling on another human being.”7 However,
this appears to contradict one’s moral intuition. Even if God is necessarily loving,
to claim that God could vastly alter moral facts (if He were to will it), contradicts
the tendency to believe that “there are some ethical claims that no being is powerful
enough to make true.”8 Wielenberg also argues that the dependency thesis negates
the possibility that objects distinct from God might be intrinsically good or evil.9 If
any object is evil only insofar as it relates to God, then the property of being evil

7

Ibid., 49.

8

Ibid.

9

Ibid.
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is conditional upon God, a being external to the object itself. However, Wielenberg
proposes that certain objects distinct from God are intrinsically evil, and thus, the
dependency thesis is false.
Lastly, Wielenberg offers a naturalistic explanation of the existence of
objective moral facts. The explanation is rather simple: “some ethical truths are
necessary truths,” in a similar manner to which the existence of God is a necessary
truth for traditional theists.10 While the theist holds that God is a metaphysically
necessary being and that moral facts necessarily obtain in light of the necessary
existence of God, Wielenberg holds that the moral facts necessarily obtain in and
of themselves. To justify such a proposal, Wielenberg appeals to the fact that
traditional theists themselves posit that “the fact that God exists is a substantive,
metaphysically necessary, brute fact.”11 Analogously, Wielenberg holds that the
moral facts are themselves brute facts and that these brute facts obtain in every
possible world independent of the existence or non-existence of God.12 Ultimately,
Wielenberg posits that basic and necessary ethical truths are sufficient for the
metaphysical grounding of objective moral facts.
Motivations to be Moral in a Godless Universe

10

Ibid., 51.
Erik Wielenberg, Robust Ethics: the Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless
Normative Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 37.
11

12

Wielenberg, Value and Virtue, 52.
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Under theism, there are two primary motivations for one to be moral. The
first motivation is the guarantee of Divine justice, the belief that moral and immoral
activity will be rewarded or punished at some future time. If there will be
recompense for every moral or immoral action, then it is always in one’s selfinterest to perform the moral action. The notion that, in every circumstance, one
has sufficient reason to act morally is encapsulated in the overriding reasons thesis,
stating that “the overriding (or strongest) reasons always favor doing what is
morally required.”13 If the consequences of some moral action were ultimately
detrimental to the actor, a multitude of theists would posit that it is unreasonable
for the actor to act morally. However, on Godless normative realism, there is no
guarantee of Divine justice, and one can imagine a multitude of scenarios in which
a moral action entails severely detrimental consequences for the actor. Thus, the
overriding reasons thesis is false given Godless normative realism.
Kant alluded to the second motivation in The Critique of Practical Reason,
wherein Kant proposes that if theism is false, then one is not justified in believing
that the highest good is in fact attainable.14 In other words, theism seems to entail
that the universe is created in such a way that humanity is capable of arriving at the

13
C. Stephen Layman, “A Moral Argument for the Existence of God,” in Is Goodness
Without God Good Enough?, ed. Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King (Maryland: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2009), 52.
14
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis,
Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill, 1788).
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end or goal of moral activity. The “ought” implies “can” principle entails that the
moral obligation (and I would add motivation) to act morally necessitates that
humanity is capable of attaining the highest good. If humanity is incapable of
attaining the highest good, then humanity has neither an obligation nor sufficient
motivation to strive after the highest good. Thus, if Godless normative realism is to
offer sufficient motivation for individuals to act morally, this motivation must not
depend upon the attainability of the highest good.
Though it is clear that any naturalistic explanation of morality is
incompatible with these two motivations to act morally, Wielenberg offers an
alternative motivation to act morally. For Wielenberg, the motivation to act morally
is contained within the concept of moral obligation itself: “that a given course of
action would satisfy one of your desires is one sort of reason for performing an
action; that a given course of action is morally obligatory is another sort of reason
for performing it.”15 This distinction appears to be the same distinction drawn
between hypothetical and categorical imperatives in The Grounding for the
Metaphysics of Morals.16 Moreover, Wielenberg finds any motivation for ethical
behavior grounded in self-interest to be contrary to the very nature of morality.17

15

Wielenberg, Value and Virtue, 78.

16
Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. J. Ellington
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993).
17

Wielenberg, Value and Virtue, 79.
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For example, if I sacrifice myself for another person because it is of great benefit
to myself, the sacrifice is not morally praiseworthy, at least not in the Kantian sense.
Hence, the first theistic motivation for moral action is insufficient to explain truly
moral behavior.
Lastly, Wielenberg offers a few examples of virtues that individuals ought
to cultivate given the truth of Godless normative realism. For the sake of space, I
will offer only one such virtue: humility. On theism, one ought to cultivate humility
because he recognizes that any impressive feature he possesses was instantiated by
God. Thus, one is not ultimately responsible for the good qualities that he possesses.
However, Wielenberg attempts to demonstrate that humility has a similar
justification on Godless normative realism, and in fact, naturalism in general. For
Wielenberg, the virtue of humility is sensible on theism because one recognizes
that he has little control over his own good fortune. Rather, God is the ultimate
reason for his good fortune. Similarly, on Godless normative realism, one ought to
realize that he has little control over his own good fortune, yet chance, as opposed
to God, is the ultimate reason for his good fortune. In this way, the virtue of
humility, on Godless normative realism, is the realization that one is subject to
chance, and that he is not ultimately responsible for the good that comes his way.

Response
Intrinsic Evil and the Divine Nature
Within this section, I seek to offer a few thoughts related to the relationship
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between evil objects and God (seen as a standard of morality). Wielenberg, when
refuting weak DCT, argued that the dependency thesis negates the possibility of
intrinsically evil actions. However, whether this refutes weak DCT is not yet
obvious and ought to be addressed more thoroughly. Wielenberg defines intrinsic
and extrinsic properties as follows: “the intrinsic value of a given thing is the value
it has, if any, solely in virtue of its intrinsic properties. The extrinsic value of a given
thing, by contrast, is the value it has in virtue of how it is related to things distinct
from itself.”18 With this definition, it would seem that if the evil nature of an object
is dependent upon the will of God, then this object is not intrinsically evil, but rather
extrinsically evil.
There are two propositions that must be affirmed in order for Wielenberg’s
argument to be successful: (1) If the dependency thesis is true, then there do not
exist intrinsically evil objects, and (2) there exist intrinsically evil objects. I will
focus here on solely proposition (2). For Wielenberg, moral obligations are the
result of either human relationships or ethical principles that are intrinsically good.
For example, Wielenberg might maintain that one ought to keep a promise to a
friend because it is an implicit requirement within a friendship, while one ought not
torture innocent children for fun because such an action is intrinsically evil. The
first type of moral obligation focuses primarily on a contractarian understanding of

18

Wielenberg, Robust Ethics, 2.
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human relationships, while the second appeals to a more categorical understanding
of moral principles. Regardless, Wielenberg admits that relationships are often
sufficient to demand some kind of moral behavior.
Now, on Godless normative realism, the absence of intrinsically evil actions
could be problematic, since, if the only source of moral obligation is human
relationships, then, when one is not constrained by a human relationship, he has no
moral obligations. For example, consider an individual who, when he is by himself,
is self-absorbed, and yet, when interacting with others, is self-sacrificing. On
Godless normative realism, this individual has no obligation to change his behavior,
though intuitively, we affirm that he ought not be self-absorbed even when his selfabsorption is unrelated to his human relationships. Thus, for Godless normative
realism to align with moral intuitions, there must exist some other source of moral
obligation, such as the intrinsic value of a character trait. If one posits that it is
intrinsically wrong to be self-absorbed and further posits that this is a sufficient
condition for the moral obligation not to be self-absorbed, then the self-absorbed
individual ought not be self-absorbed, even when he is alone.
However, with respect to traditional theism, there do not exist actions
independent of the relationship between God and man. Hence, if theism is true, then
one ought not be self-absorbed even when he is alone since he is obligated, in the
relational sense, not to be self-absorbed. Consequently, on theism, if no actions are
intrinsically evil, this does not alter one’s moral obligations. Hence, why should the
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theist not claim that all moral and immoral actions possess only extrinsic value and
maintain that one is obligated to act morally due to the relationship between man
and his Creator? Would such a position be detrimental to the theistic explanation
of morality? Such a theory appears to be extensionally equivalent to a theistic
explanation incorporating intrinsically good actions. Moreover, the affirmation of
intrinsically evil or intrinsically good actions appears to be quite Kantian, and as
such, might not gain support from a multitude of ethicists, since metaethical
theories such as egoism and utilitarianism already deny the intrinsic good of ethical
actions. As a result of these considerations, Wielenberg’s insistence that certain
moral facts must possess intrinsic value, as he defines intrinsic value, appears
unjustified.
Equivocating the Term ‘Ought”
It is common for the naturalist to claim that naturalism offers a solid
foundation for morality because belief in God is not necessary for moral behavior.
However, it ought to be noted that such a statement, though true, does not refute
the first premise of the moral argument given within this paper. This paper is not
concerned with whether one is capable of being moral while naturalism obtains,
but rather whether it is reasonable for one to be moral while naturalism obtains. It
is simple to argue that “a person can be moral without belief in God,” but much
more difficult to give rational justification for the performance of particular moral
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actions.19 However, even demonstrating that it is reasonable for an individual to
perform a moral action X, given naturalism, is not equivalent to the claim that an
individual ought to perform X given naturalism.
In evaluating whether Wielenberg’s theory offers a robust explanation of
moral facts, one should recognize a couple of subtle distinctions between different
uses of the term ‘ought’. There are two uses of the word ‘ought’ with which I am
interested. The first use is related to an expected consequence of previously
obtaining states of affairs. For example, we often say things such as “The airconditioner has been turned off for a few weeks, so the electric bill ought to be
fairly cheap this month.” Ought, when used in this sense, is not an inherently moral
term, but rather a term referring to rational consequences of a group of facts. The
other meaning of the term ‘ought’ is related to the deviation from a standard. For
example, the phrase “He ought not to have stolen from her” is not concerned with
whether stealing follows rationally from previously known facts, but rather with
whether stealing corresponds to a standard of human conduct.
Ultimately, the first use of the term ‘ought’ is insufficient for moral
obligation, though it might be sufficient for a rational obligation. When discussing
the foundation of virtue on Godless normative realism, Wielenberg demonstrates
that an individual ought to cultivate humility as a rational response to facts

Paul Kurtz, “The Kurtz/Craig Debate: Is Goodness without God Good Enough?,” in Is
Goodness Without God Good Enough?, trans. Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King (Maryland,
Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 25.
19
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obtaining in the world, namely, that one has little control over his own good fortune,
and chance is ultimately responsible for one’s good fortune. However,
demonstrating that one ought to be humble where ‘ought’ is used in the first sense
does not imply that one has a moral obligation to be humble. Hence, Wielenberg’s
argumentation, as it stands, fails to explain why one is morally obligated to be
humble, though it is successful in demonstrating the rationality of humility given
naturalism.
DCT and Arbitrary Moral Principles
Since the majority of Wielenberg’s argumentation in opposition to the
theistic account of morality is dependent on the Euthyphro Dilemma, defending a
theistic response to the Euthyphro Dilemma serves to remove much of the support
for Godless normative realism. There are three primary responses to the Euthyphro
dilemma: (1) strong DCT, (2) weak DCT, and (3) the autonomy thesis, where the
autonomy thesis is the proposition that necessary and objective moral facts exist
ontologically independent of God. Both Wielenberg’s argument from the problem
of evil and his argument from the fact that moral facts become arbitrary as a result
of the control thesis supply good reason to reject strong DCT. Moreover, because
the autonomy thesis affirms that objective moral facts exist independently of God,
the foundation for these facts is independent of God. Therefore, if the autonomy
thesis is true, premise (1) of the moral argument within this paper is probably false.
Consequently, weak DCT seems to be the response to the Euthyphro dilemma with
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the most optimistic outlook.
The first argument in refutation of weak DCT, the argument from the
existence of intrinsically good and intrinsically evil moral actions, was discussed
previously. The second argument against weak DCT, the argument from the
intuition that no being could possess the power to alter moral facts, will be
addressed here. If this second objection can be overcome, weak DCT is still a
tenable response to the Euthyphro dilemma. To begin, if some fact necessarily
obtains, this does not entail that this fact is ontologically independent of other
necessary facts. For example, consider the fact “2+2=4.” This fact is dependent on
the Peano axioms of arithmetic, meaning that “2+2=4” obtains because the Peano
axioms obtain. However, the fact “2+2=4” still obtains necessarily. In the same
way, we can maintain that moral facts obtain necessarily, and yet, are dependent
upon the existence of God: “If necessary truths can stand to one another in
asymmetric relations of explanatory priority, then there is no objection so far to
holding that moral values exist because God exists.”20
Now, the objector to weak DCT might argue as follows. Assume that the
dependency thesis is true. Then, for some evil action x, if God were to will that x is
good, then x would be good. The difficulty with such an argument is that “the
counterfactual in question has an impossible antecedent, and so, on the customary

William Lane Craig, “The Most Gruesome of Guests,” in Is Goodness Without God
Good Enough?, trans. Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield,
2009), 170.
20
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semantics, has no nonvacuous truth value.”21 In other words, there does not exist a
possible world in which God wills that x is good, and moreover, neither does there
exist a possible world in which x is morally good. Both the nature of God and the
fact that x is an evil action obtain in all possible worlds. Hence, it is difficult to
ascertain the meaning of such a counterfactual. Consequently, I am unconvinced
that the dependency thesis leads to conflicts with strongly held moral intuitions or
moral presuppositions. It seems sufficient to know that moral facts obtain
necessarily, regardless of whether these facts are explanatorily dependent upon the
existence of God. Finally, if the dependency thesis is unscathed by Wielenberg’s
objections, then weak DCT is at least one plausible theistic explanation for the
existence of objective moral facts.
The Autonomy Thesis and the Need for God
Lastly, let us assume that the Autonomy Thesis is in fact correct. Are there
still moral characteristics of the world that are unexplained by Godless normative
realism? So far within this paper, we have focused particularly upon the explanatory
power of theism and Godless normative realism as they relate to the existence of
objective moral facts and motivations for moral behaviors. However, even if theism
is an insufficient foundation for these two aspects of morality, theism seems to offer
a few explanations for separate aspects of morality. Particularly, theism offers an

21

Ibid., 172.
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explanation for the possibility of moral knowledge, and theism offers an
explanation for why necessary and objective moral facts pertain to humanity.
First, if theism is true, then one would expect that God created humans with
the capability of possessing moral knowledge since a good God would desire his
creatures to know and uphold the standard for moral living. However, if naturalism
is true, there is little to no reason to expect that the beliefs we possess about morality
correspond to objective moral facts. Rather, our moral beliefs are likely to
correspond to those beliefs that are most evolutionarily beneficial, and the beliefs
that are most evolutionarily beneficial need not be the same as the beliefs
corresponding to objective moral facts. Since humans do in fact possess moral
knowledge, these considerations offer good support for the truth of theism.
Second, theism offers an explanation of the fact that objective moral facts
pertain to humanity and alter human behavior since an intelligent creator of the
universe is capable of intentionally organizing creation in such a way as to
incorporate necessary moral facts into daily human life. If naturalism is true, we do
not have an explanation for why humans are moral beings, beings concerned with
objective moral facts. For example, humans appear to be the only beings on earth
capable of ascertaining moral facts. This means that somewhere within the
evolutionary process, humans must have become cognizant of objective moral
facts, yet offering an explanation for this phenomenon on naturalism is difficult, if
not, impossible.
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These additional moral features of the world, though not contained within
the moral argument with which we are primarily concerned, again support the
notion that the explanatory scope of theism is greater than that of Godless normative
realism. Therefore, though Godless normative realism may offer a partial
explanation for the moral characteristics of the world, theism ultimately appears to
be a superior explanation.

Conclusion
Within this paper, it has been demonstrated that Godless normative realism
is one possible explanation for the existence of objective moral facts and
motivations for moral behavior. However, the explanation for these two moral
aspects of the world given by Godless normative realism appears to be less
powerful, though plausible, than the theistic explanation. Also, the theistic
explanation of morality appears to span a broad range of moral characteristics of
the world, while the scope of Godless normative realism is more modest. Therefore,
though Godless normative realism diminishes the strength of the abductive moral
argument given at the beginning of this paper, it does so minimally, and
consequently, the existence of objective moral facts and motivations for moral
behavior still offer good reasons to hold that theism is true.
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